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ABSTRACT 
The objective of the paper is to introduce a comprehensive approach to the emergence of the 
European Union’s security and defence policy (ESDP) in 1998/9. In particular, the - direct and 
indirect - impact of the United States is the focus of the examinations. It is demonstrated that the 
prominently promoted Realist emphasis of structural power conditions, such as unipolarity and 
German reunification, is misleading. More importantly, the conceptual lenses of (soft) balancing 
against  and  bandwagoning  with  power  cannot  grasp  the  differentiated  nature  of  ESDP  and 
provide, therefore, a flawed approach.  
In contrast, the paper argues that liberal-institutionalist thought and ‘transaction costs economics’ 
offer  a  heuristically  promising  point  of  departure.  More  specifically,  it  focuses  not  only  on 
uncertainty and the resulting risks of opportunism, but also on the specificity of those assets that 
the  ESDP  has  ultimately  created.  Empirically,  it  is  argued  that  Britain  and  France  were 
increasingly  confronted  with  high  risks  of  opportunism  within  NATO  to  provide  European 
security. The American commitment to all kinds of security problems had suffered credibility 
and, therefore, the medium powers had searched for another institutional option to perform this 
task on a long-term basis. While this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial 
establishment of ESDP, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. 
After all, the superpower and most influential NATO member would not stand aside to watch 
the creation of a competitor to the Alliance. Hence ESDP had to be compatible with NATO, which 
was assured by all participants and was subsequently incorporated into the EU's agreements. 
General,  and  thus  redeployable,  military  assets  represented  the  institutional  solution  to  the 
conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For one decade, Europe's medium powers have been promoting a security and defence 
pillar  within  the  European  Union  (EU),  after  several  attempts  had  failed  in  and 
immediately after the Cold War. The Franco-British Declaration of St Malo (1998) set a 
process  in  motion,  which  subsequently  gathered  increased  attention  by  scholars  of 
International Relations.1 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents a 
challenge to scholars not only because it is a novel security institution, but also because 
of its ambivalent nature. First, it did not replace NATO under American leadership, but 
emerged in parallel. Second, the United States' reaction has nonetheless been hesitant 
and sometimes even hostile. Finally, the sole superpowers' 'special partner', namely the 
United Kingdom (UK), was one of the main architects of the newly established security 
institution. Therefore, the general question arises of how one could make sense of the 
emergence of ESDP and, in particular, how could one explain it from the perspective of 
existing mainstream theories?  
Not surprisingly, the keepers of the Grail of security studies were among the first to 
develop  systematic  explanations  of  recent  developments.  Realist  scholars  primarily 
inferred their explanations of these novel alliance strategies from changing structural 
power constellations,  such as unipolarity or German reunification (Posen 2004, 2006; 
Jones  2003,  2007).  Though  to  different  degrees,  the  general  message  was  that  the 
establishment  of  ESDP  represented  a  form  of  weak  or  soft  balancing  -  not  directly 
related against US power, but, at least, prompted by it (e.g. Posen 2006: 186; Art 2005/6: 
184; Jones 2007: 8-10). This paper addresses the Realists' responses to both questions: 
why ESDP emerged; and what ESDP is ultimately about. It is argued that the Realist 
lenses of ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ are not a helpful device to understand and 
explain  the  security  institution.  In  particular,  the  American  impact  on  institution-
building processes in ESDP cannot be adequately captured.  
                                                 
1 Joint Declaration by the French and British Government, (St Malo: 3/4 December 1998), cited from: Rutten 2001: 
8-9. 3 
 
Liberal-institutionalist  thought,  in  general,  and  transaction  costs  economics,  in 
particular, offer a much more promising point of departure (e.g. Keohane 1984; Lake 
1999; Weber 2000). More specifically, a transaction costs framework focuses not only on 
uncertainty and the resulting risks of opportunism, but also on the specificity of those 
assets that the security institution ultimately creates (Williamson 1985). While the former 
is  able  to  explain  why  the  EU  members  initiated  ESDP  at  all,  the  latter  provides  a 
conceptual  lens  to  understand  better  the  specific  design  of  ESDP.  When  we  aim  to 
understand  and  explain  why  the  main  EU  members  established  ESDP  rather  than  a 
‘European Security and Defence Identity’ within NATO, we need to focus on how the 
United  States  actively  contributed  to  the  Europeans'  risks  of  opportunism  and  thus 
transaction costs that they were faced with. The paper demonstrates empirically how 
isolationist  concerns  increased  the  fears  of  opportunism  among  the  key  European 
governments. Their ex post transaction costs – particularly within NATO – to provide 
for European security were growing decisively and entailed them to establish the ESDP 
within the Union. This enterprise, however, was explicitly not directed against the United 
States or NATO. Nevertheless, it prompted concerns among the Americans and they 
formulated  -  at  least,  implicitly  -  a  threat  to  withdraw  completely  from  European 
security crises. This had a sustainable impact on the Europeans' assessment of ex ante 
transaction costs for the future provision of security.  
This  contested  nature  of  ESDP  was  particularly  based  on  the  dilemma  between 
autonomous military capabilities and NATO's historically evolved primacy. Britain and 
France, the two initiators of ESDP, have traditionally represented these diametrically 
opposed positions. The key to, nonetheless, establish a EU security and defence pillar 
was  ultimately  the  creation  of  non-specific,  general  military  assets.  These  were 
redeployable to other purposes - also to NATO. This sustainably reconciled American 
concerns about European autonomy and could, nevertheless, equip the Europeans with 
more capabilities to project force. Although general assets facilitated less efficiency gains, 
they contributed to a long-term reduction of transaction costs that the EU members were 
faced with.  4 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First of all, I focus on recent Realists’ attempts to 
explain  the  emergence  of  ESDP.  More  specifically,  this  approach  is  applied  to  the 
question of why the European Union has acquired a security and defence policy since 
1998/9 and in how far we may understand this development through the lenses of ‘soft 
balancing’.  After  this  critical  review,  the  paper  develops  an  own  approach  to  the 
problematique  building  on  ‘transaction  costs  economics’.  It  applies  the  concepts  of 
‘uncertainty’  and  ‘asset  specificity’  to  the  key  European  states,  namely  France  and 
Britain. It is empirically demonstrated that the United States had a significant impact on 
its European partners, but not in a way supposed by Realists. The most crucial aspects 
are (1) their assessment in how far the United States would (not) further contribute to 
the general provision of European security and (2) the nature of the assets at stake. A 
‘structured, focused comparison’ of the signalling processes between the main actors 
will provide the empirical evidence for this argument.2  
 
ESDP AS A SECURITY INSTITUTION 
After  diplomatic  preparations  in  Pörtschach  and  St  Malo  in  1998,  two  European 
Councils in 1999 laid the groundwork for the European Security and Defence Policy.3 
While the governments created the institutional arrangements in Cologne, they beefed 
them up in terms of military capabilities by agreeing on the Helsinki Headline Goal (e.g. 
IISS 2001: 283-91). The Treaty of Nice ultimately integrated these cooperative steps into 
the European Union in 2000.4 After the first ESDP missions, a new military component 
was added to the catalogue system of the Headline Goal, namely the ‘battlegroups’ in 
                                                 
2 The paper builds thereby on different sources of data, such as strategic documents, speeches, media 
reports, and some expert interviews. 
3 “Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence”, (Cologne: European Council, 3-4 June 1999); General Affairs Council, (Brussels: 15 November 
1999); “Presidency Conclusions: II. Common European Policy on Security and Defence”, (Helsinki: 
European Council, 10-11 December 1999), cited from: Rutten 2001: 41-5, 66; 82-91.  
4 For the most relevant components of the Nice Treaty (Presidency Conclusions with numerous annexes, 
treaty amendment, report of Mr CFSP, etc.), see, Rutten 2001: 168-221. See for the establishment of the EU’s 
political-military structures, Council Decisions 2001/78-80/CFSP, 22 January 2001.  5 
 
2003.  Their  focus  was  more  on  rapid  reaction,  however,  at  a  smaller  scale  than  the 
European Rapid Reaction Forces established in Helsinki (Lindstrom 2007). 
These  political  developments  represent  a  puzzle  in  empirical  logic  since  the 
observable expansion in European security policy could be considered a major surprise 
for contemporary witnesses:  significant progress of a European security and defence 
pillar  within  the  EU  rather  than  NATO,  as  all  commentators  had  expected.  A 
retrospective view of the two most important players in the mid-1990s illustrates the 
puzzling nature of ESDP – even though meanwhile we perceive its existence as normal. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  was  evident  for  several reasons  that  the  United  Kingdom  (UK) 
would never opt for a genuinely European solution to defence issues. Instead, it would 
always stick to the ‘special relationship’ with the United States (e.g. McInnes 1998: 835): 
if a European pillar in security and defence issues was to be strengthened, it would be 
located  within  NATO.  This  had  been American  policy  since  Kennedy,  British  policy 
even before that, German policy most of the time and would have to become French 
policy, too. In other words, there were some uncontested parameters in the European 
security architecture. On the other hand, France had just elected Jacques Chirac as new 
President of the Republic. He immediately began one of the most prestigious projects in 
French politics, namely a massive transformation of the armed forces coupled with a 
new  defence  policy  (Chirac  1996).  Apart  from  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  two 
developments, in particular, made French defence reforms seem inevitable: firstly, the 
quasi-failure to project their own forces into the Gulf region in 1991; secondly, the close 
cooperation with the United Kingdom on the ground in Bosnia. What could we expect 
from these two developments emerging at the same time? The answer is clear: French 
rapprochement with the Atlantic Alliance (Millon 1996; Grant 1996).  
At first glance, thus, a strengthened European pillar within NATO would have been 
the allegedly obvious path to European security and defence policy. However, the actual 
development differed significantly to the extent that the pillar exists, in fact, outside the 
Alliance and inside the EU. In Henry Kissinger’s words: "the distinctive feature of the 
European  Union  military  force  (…)  is  to  create  a  capacity  to  act  outside  the  NATO 6 
 
framework" (Kissinger 2001: 34). This puzzle requires a comprehensive explanation from 
International Relations Theory and Realist proponents were among the first to account 
for these developments (e.g. Jones 2003; Posen 2004). Before I go into detail of their 
approaches, however, the 'explanandum' needs to be precisely defined.  
In  terms  of  political  sciences  concepts,  we  observe  policy  adjustment  or  simply 
cooperation between several states with the purpose to work together in a certain issue-
area  (e.g.  Keohane  1984:  51).  More  specifically,  the  EU  governments  adjust  in  the 
security  domain  to  establish  common  political-military  structures  in  the  Union’s 
framework. They are building security institutions, which are “structures or agreements 
for governing cooperation between partners” (Lake 1999: 38).5 They are designed “to 
guard states’ autonomy against the political effects of the threat of (…) force; and to 
prevent the emergence of situations that could endanger states’ vital interests as they 
define them” (Wallander et al. 1999: 2).6 From a Realist point of view, which is in this 
respect fully compatible with the paper's conceptualisation, ESDP is designed to protect 
the Europeans' security interests - largely independent from US military assets and, in 
particular, without Washington's approval. For that purpose, they establish political and 
military assets on a common basis (e.g. Posen 2004; Jones 2007). The core question of this 
paper is therefore what drove these puzzling developments? Was it primarily a response 
to both unipolarity and a potential security dilemma in Europe, as Realists argue? Or 
was it rather the attempt to reduce - ex post and ex  ante - transaction costs for  the 
provision of European security? 
Before  we  ultimately  confront  these  competing  explanations  at  a  theoretical  and 
empirical  level,  some  brief  methodological  remarks  are  required.  The  paper's 
explanatory  strategy  develops  a  ‘processual  perspective’  of  institution-building  in 
                                                 
5 This definition is fully compatible with Realists' understanding of institutions. John Mearsheimer defines 
"institutions as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each 
other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior" 
(Mearsheimer 1994/5: 8).  
6 In particular, this latter function, which is practically synonymous with what Arnold Wolfers had labelled 
‘milieu goals’ (Wolfers 1962: 73-76), will be of interest in the context of the paper because it represents the 
core of the EU’s efforts.  7 
 
European  security  (Walt  2009:  91). 7 Therefore,  a  ‘structured,  focused  comparison’ 8 
systematically  analyses  the  institutional  development  according  to  a  process-tracing 
logic (George and McKeown 1985; George and Bennett 2005). This kind of comparison 
mainly  suggests  that  the  qualitatively  analysed  case  will  not  become  arbitrarily 
combined with each other, but compared in a formal and systematic way. Finally, the 
primary empirical evidence consists of documentary sources: firstly, strategies, position 
papers,  reports,  speeches  and  other  official  sources;  secondly,  a  comprehensive 
newspaper search (Factiva and Lexis/Nexis); thirdly, some policy papers and secondary 
literature of historians and political scientists.9  
 
ESDP AS 'SOFT BALANCING' AND 'BINDING' IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD? 
Realist thought still dominates thinking in International Relations about security. This is 
particularly  applicable  to  American  Political  Science,  which  has  increasingly  become 
interested in the EU’s recent efforts to institutionalise defence in the previous years (Art 
1996; Art 2005/6; Jones 2003, 2007; Posen 2004, 2006). Realist scholars infer the primary 
determinant of the emergence and development of security institutions from anarchy 
and the distribution of material capabilities (i.e. power). In short, institutions "largely 
mirror the distribution of power in the system" (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 13). Based on this 
premise, Barry Posen and Seth Jones attempted to explain the emergence of ESDP by a 
combination of the international and the European system.  
                                                 
7 This paper is part of a larger project that systematically compared the sources of German, British and 
French preferences for institution-building since the mid-1990s. Even though the presented evidence refers 
merely to some selected sources, the foundation is normally much more comprehensive. This is primarily 
due to space constraints.  
8 “A comparison of two or more cases is ‘focused’ insofar as the researcher deals selectively with only those 
aspects of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the 
study. Similarly, controlled comparison is ‘structured’ when the researcher, in designing the study, defines 
and standardizes the data requirements of the case studies. This is accomplished by formulating 
theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case” (George/McKeown 1985: 41).  
9 Furthermore, I conducted some structured, open-ended interviews with several senior officials and policy 
experts. Most of the interviews were face-to-face, a few per e-mail and/or telephone. All of them were 
conducted under the ‘Chatham House Rules’. A qualitative content analysis examined this broad range of 
data according to theoretically inferred categories. 8 
 
Theory 
Firstly, the global power shift from bi- to unipolarity accounts for the initial emergence 
and further development of ESDP in the end of the 1990s. Without a major threat from 
the East, the EU states wanted to project power abroad and become more autonomous 
from the United States (Posen 2004: 15; 2006: 166-182; Jones 2007: 24-32; 81-92; 197-202).10 
Realist scholars labelled this alliance strategy 'weak' or ‘soft balancing’ (Posen 2006: 186; 
Jones  2007:  9-10)  that  is  largely  understood  as  "constraining  U.S.  power  by  other 
(diplomatic) means" (Paul 2005: 58-59). This kind of soft balancing does neither perceive 
the US as a military threat nor aims to change the overall balance of power. Instead, it 
strives for more desired outcomes in the international system. In short, it is argued that 
the  building  of  ESDP  represents  an  act  of  soft  balancing  on  behalf  of  the  EU 
governments  and  is  primarily  caused  by  the  structural  condition  of  unipolarity  (Art 
2005/6: 184; Posen 2006: 159; Jones 2007: 24).  
Secondly,  “structural  shifts  in  Europe  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  triggered  an 
increase  in  security  cooperation  through  the  European  Union.  Cooperation  allowed 
European states to bind Germany and ensure long-term peace on the continent” (Jones 
2007: 11). Two (rare) conditions lead to such a 'binding' strategy: (1) a potential security 
dilemma; and (2) a status quo attitude of the threatening state. Again, power or - more 
specifically - the extent of the superpower's military presence serves as an important 
background condition because it determines in how far a security dilemma is likely to 
arise  (Jones  2007:  59-62).  In  other  words,  the  distribution  of  European  capabilities 
entailed Germany's partners - France and Britain, in particular - to promote security 
cooperation within the EU because this would bind Germany on a long-term basis. In 
combination with concerns about an American withdrawal, it was ultimately the far-
sighted identification of a possibly arising security dilemma on behalf of the German 
leaders  and  their  willingness  to  mitigate  it  that  led  to  the  establishment  of  security 
                                                 
10 According to Stephen Walt, this alliance strategy could also be termed 'leash-slipping' - that is an 
alignment intended to enhance autonomy (Walt 2009: 107-8). Nevertheless, this paper refers more directly to 
the Realist literature on ESDP, which usually coins it as 'soft', 'weak' or 'moderate balancing' (Posen, Art, 
Jones etc.).  9 
 
institutions within the EU in the 1990s (Jones 2003: 143). In short, it is argued that - after 
German  reunification  -  the  structure  of  the  European  system  entailed  the  risk  of  an 
emerging security dilemma, which was recognised by European leaders. Therefore, they 
established ESDP as a forum to ameliorate the dilemma. After having presented the two 
primary determinants of the paper's 'explanans' at a theoretical level, the next step seeks 
for empirical evidence.  
Empirical evidence 
Firstly, let us consider the material distribution of capabilities. In contrast to the bipolar 
system  of  the  Cold  War,  the  1990s  were  undoubtedly  characterised  by  unipolarity 
(Wolforth 1999). From the perspective of military capabilities, in particular, the United 
States  largely  possesses  "command  of  the  commons"  and  this  will  supposedly  not 
change in the near future (Posen 2003). At first glance, therefore, it appears plausible 
that  the  European  medium  powers,  such  as  France  or  Great  Britain,  pursue  distinct 
alliance strategies in a uni- than in a bipolar system. Furthermore, it is simply striking 
that there was no ESDP under bipolarity; and there is ESDP under unipolarity. The 
building  of  the  EU's  military  forces  "has  been  caused  by  the  structural  shift  to 
unipolarity  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  In  a  unipolar  system,  EU  states  have  been 
motivated by a desire to decrease reliance on the US and increase power abroad" (Jones 
2007: 217). According to that, the broad timing of the ESDP's establishment makes sense 
and, therefore, the distribution of power serves as a persuasive point of departure.  
If we take, however, a closer look and compare the distribution of capabilities of the 
mid-1990s, when France promoted rapprochement with the Alliance (e.g. Millon 1996) 
and  Britain  vehemently  opposed  a  defence  pillar  for  the  EU  in  Amsterdam  (e.g. 
Government of the UK 1995a, 1995b), first doubts will arise (Weiss forthcoming). ESDP 
was  not  proposed  in  1998/9  for  the  first  time.  The  Intergovernmental  Conference  in 
Amsterdam (1996/7) has already had these issues on the agenda (EU Reflection Group. 10 
 
1995).11 However,  Britain  -  under  the  Blair  government  -  refused  to  discuss  defence 
matters and the initiative consequently failed. The distribution of material capabilities 
had not changed between the mid-1990s and 1999, when ESDP was established. This 
suggests that some additional factors must have been effective. Therefore, Realists argue 
that unipolarity does not dictate a choice, but leaves sufficient room for manoeuvre (e.g. 
incentives,  constraints  etc.) (Posen 2006: 160). In other words,  it must have been the 
diverging intervening variable - the distinct perception of unipolarity by political leaders 
- that led to the creation of a security institution within the EU. Due to the fact that 
France and the United Kingdom were the two critical players to establish ESDP, the 
paper focuses in more detail on empirical evidence from the two countries.12  
On the one hand, French support for the establishment of ESDP in the end of the 
1990s is hardly puzzling. The government had always been a strong supporter of a more 
autonomous  Europe  with  respect  to  defence  issues.  Even  under  supposedly  less 
intriguing  conditions  of  bipolarity,  France  promoted  defence  cooperation  among 
Europeans and without the United States (Posen 2004: 15). This search for autonomy 
entailed American opposition and might be categorised as a 'balancing act' against the 
sole  superpower.  At  the  same  time,  the  government  has  never  been  willing  to  'exit' 
completely from bandwagoning within NATO.13 It always made clear that the Alliance 
should  co-exist  (Juppé  1996;  Richard  2000a).  Therefore,  Paris  was  also  among  the 
strongest supporters of the NATO Response Force in 2003 (Rynning 2005), which should 
represent the Europeans' key contribution to the Alliance's crisis management. In short, 
France seemed to have a more differentiated strategy towards NATO and the EU than 
                                                 
11 See also, “EU-WEU: Text of the Document of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg on 
the Gradual Integration of the WEU into the European Union”, No. 2906, Atlantic News, 3 April 1997. 
12 From a Realist perspective, the alliance strategies of Europe's great powers are so enlightening since the 
governments have simultaneously two options: either bandwagoning with NATO or balancing via the EU. 
While France and the UK are neither sufficiently powerful in terms of material capabilities to expect 
undoubtedly balancing, nor are they so small that they must clearly bandwagon from a structural realist 
perspective (Posen 2006: 158). 
13 See also, “M. Chirac S’Exprimera Deux Fois sur la Politique Européene – Les Principaux Points de la 
Position Francaise”, Le Monde, 21 February 1996; and, “EU/Defence/France/Germany”, Agence Europe, 28 
January 1997; and, “UK ‘To Veto’ EU Defence Bid – France and Germany Push for Closer Ties” by Caroline 
Southey and Lionel Barber, Financial Times, 24 March 1997. 11 
 
the balancing concept indicates. This primarily suggests that there is more to the French 
position  than  simply  countervailing  the  United  States  in  some  way  or  the  other. 
Nevertheless,  in  terms  of  the  two  competing  options  from  a  Realist  perspective,  the 
French had always tended towards the 'balancing via the EU'. However, it is vital that 
this has largely been independent from the polarity of the international system.  
On  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain  constitutes  the  more  challenging  case  from  the 
perspective of competing alliance strategies. It maintained its 'special relationship' with 
the  sole  superpower,  which  makes  the  identification  of  a  (soft)  balancing  strategy 
inherently difficult. Nevertheless, it could represent the decisive instance from a Realist 
perspective  since  it  (slightly)  shifted  its  alliance  strategy  after  the  distribution  of 
capabilities had changed from bi- to unipolarity. Barry Posen primarily argues in terms 
of the British dissatisfaction with dependency on the US, which manifested itself during 
the crises in the Balkans. At a secondary level, it was about the financial costs of military 
capabilities  and  Britain's  role  in  Europe  (Posen  2004:  15;  Posen  2006:  167-70).  This 
alliance strategy, however, is not 'balancing': 
British policy, since 1998, has tended more toward bandwagoning with the United States 
than to balancing U.S. power. Nevertheless, Britain’s bandwagoning is strategic; it hopes 
to achieve influence on key policies in return for material support. Britain has supported 
ESDP in the hope of making Europe more powerful and more influential (Posen 2006: 
167).  
From Posen's point of view, the critical aspect is that the British alliance strategy can be 
inferred from unipolarity. After the demise of the Soviet threat, Europe should not only 
become more influential in world affairs, but also become capable to deal forcefully with 
conflicts at its periphery. The key was its perception of American reluctance to engage 
itself in European conflicts, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s (Posen 2006: 167). Despite 
the fact that the available evidence largely confirms Posen's argument for the British case 
at  an  empirical  level  (e.g.  Weiss  2008),  the  major  flaw  stems  from  his  theoretical 
approach. In Realist terms, the only observable shift of alliance strategies is Britain's 
'strategic' bandwagoning with US power - instead, of bandwagoning in former times. It 
becomes, however, not clear why this should classify ESDP as a weak form of balancing.   12 
 
This  critical  review  of  unipolarity  as  the  main  determinant  of  ESDP  can  be 
summarised as follows. On the one hand, the French government largely strived for a 
multipolar world and came thus closest to the alliance strategy of balancing against US 
power. That was, however, completely independent from unipolarity. Identical - or even 
stronger - evidence could be found for Cold War's bipolarity. On the other hand, Britain 
pursued 'strategic bandwagoning' with Washington. It wanted to strengthen its voice, 
but not exit NATO. This is largely a persuasive description of the British shift, but the 
question arises why ESDP should, then, be regarded as "a form of balancing behaviour, 
albeit still a weak form" (Posen 2006: 186)? If ESDP is both British bandwagoning with 
the US and French balancing against the sole superpower, why should we not precisely 
understand it as that? In other words, the argument is primarily flawed for two reasons: 
(1) France's balancing case cannot be unambiguously inferred from the power structure 
(i.e. independent variable). (2) Britain's case correlates to the independent variable, but 
remains, nonetheless, bandwagoning. The problem is, therefore, less a lack of empirical 
evidence, but accommodating the latter with the theoretical reasoning.  
Secondly, Seth Jones has introduced another variable from a Realist perspective to 
explain the emergence of a EU security institution - namely a 'binding strategy' on behalf 
of France and Britain to "incorporate a potential threat into an institution" (Jones 2007: 
59).14 In contrast to previous failures of establishing a security arm of the EU, "German 
reunification and concerns about an American withdrawal created a potential security 
dilemma in Europe. But German leaders understood the dilemma and were willing to 
ameliorate it through the EU" (Jones 2007: 86). Although Jones treats the building of 
security  institutions  separately  from  the  establishment  of  military  forces,  both 
explanations are inferred from structural conditions: on the one hand, unipolarity and a 
decreased military presence of the US in Europe; and a potential security dilemma in 
Europe arising from German reunification, on the other (Jones 2007: 81-92, 197-202).  
                                                 
14 This is close to Joseph Grieco's 'Realist' argument on the EU's monetary integration, which strongly builds 
on Albert Hirschman.  13 
 
The argument is primarily flawed due to the lack of empirical evidence.15 One can 
even  discern  several  opposite  indicators.  The  UK  and  France  were  regularly  more 
concerned about a militarily weak Germany than about a potentially strong one. More 
specifically,  they  jointly  promoted  'convergence  criteria'  for  defence  planning,  which 
referred - more or less directly - to Germany that  could spend too little on military 
capabilities.16 Although  the  increase  of  military  capabilities  would  be  within  the  EU, 
Germany's projection of force could ultimately be pursued in a purely national context. 
It even created national headquarters for the first time since the end of World War II. 
That granted Germany the capability of autonomous military planning and was strongly 
supported by Britain and France. From the latter's perspective, this was not binding the 
potential  hegemon,  but  binding  the  laggard  of  the  military  project. 17 After  some 
Capabilities Commitment Conferences had demonstrated European and, in particular, 
German  weaknesses  in  expeditionary  warfare,  the  UK  and  France  initiated  a 
modernised concept, namely so-called ‘battlegroups’. In this respect, the governments 
wanted even to include explicit numbers and regions into the agreements in order to 
oblige members, such as especially Germany, to deliver the promised assets.18  
                                                 
15 As part of a larger project, the paper seriously attempted to find empirical evidence for the ‘binding’ 
hypothesis that went beyond some biographical notes of Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand in 
1990, who were wholeheartedly critical towards German reunification. Nothing was found for the time since 
the outbreak of the crises in the Balkans. Therefore, I developed indicators and asked some French and 
British officials and policy experts for that underlying motivation behind ESDP. I simply found no 
indication for the study’s period of analysis. Instead, all interviewees emphasised the urgency to increase 
Germany's military capabilities for the purpose of coordinated power projection.  
Another indicator was the Royal Air Force's complete withdrawal from Germany in the end of the 1990s. 
This did clearly not suggest serious British concerns about the necessity to bind the Continental power 
(Government of the UK 1998: 37-38, 50, 146). 
16 British-Italian Summit (1999): Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative, (London: 
19-20 July 1999); and, French Action Plan (1999): Letter from the French President Jacques Chirac to the Finish 
Presidency of the European Union, (Paris: 22 July 1999), cited from: Rutten 2001: 46-53. 
See, for example, “Cooperation Talks Aim at Giving EU a Military Role Within NATO: Blair and Chirac 
Sketch Defense Pact” by Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune, 4 December 1998; and, “France, Britain, 
Germany said near EU defence deal” by Mark John and Marie-Louise Moller, Reuters News, 28 November 
2003. See also, Cook, 2000.  
17 Therefore, even the explicit expression of ‘bandwagoning’ or ‘free-riding’ was applied in order to warn 
the Germans to keep their commitments (e.g. Heisbourg 2000; see also, Richard 2000b). 
18 The demand of explicit numbers in the ‘battlegroup agreement’ was explicitly directed against 
‘capabilities laggards’, such as Germany. This was repeatedly mentioned by UK officials (Interview with a 
German MoD official, Berlin: April 2007). See also, “Berlin to join UK and France in battle groups’” by Judy 
Dempsey, Financial Times, 11 February 2004.  14 
 
In  sum,  France's  and  Great  Britain's  perception  was  that  Berlin  had  not  done  its 
homework – namely to reform the ‘Bundeswehr’: “it [i.e. Germany] will definitely have 
to increase its budget investment in the military field. The imbalance between its role in 
Europe and its defence funding is too striking today” (French National Assembly 2005: 
50 of 60).19 One may admit that British and French concerns about a hegemonic Germany 
played a role in the very beginning of the 1990s – when ESDP, or something similar, 
failed to be established. In contrast, when ESDP actually emerged, the situation was the 
opposite: Germany should arm - also at a national level - and contribute more strongly 
to the provision of European security.  
• Unipolarity of the international 
system
– State leaders' perception of the 
distribution of material capabilities 
(i.e. power)
– Need and willingness to aggregate 
power
– 'Soft or weak balancing' as possible 
alliance strategy 
• Potential security dilemma in Europe
– State leaders' perception of security 
dilemma (i.e. German unification)
– Need and willingness of potential 
hegemon to ameliorate it
– 'Binding' the regional hegemon as 
possible alliance strategy
Realist determinants of ESDP
• France
– No change of alliance strategy under 
unipolarity (i.e. continuous 'soft 
balancing')
– Concerns about the US, but 
acceptance of NATO's primacy 
– No fear of reunified Germany and 
binding the 'laggard'
• Great Britain
– Slight change of alliance strategy 
under unipolarity (i.e. 'strategic' 
bandwagoning)
– Neither concerns about unipolarity
nor about German hegemony
– Not balancing against US power and 
binding merely the 'laggard'
Empirical evidence
Building of security institutions on 
the basis of 'against' or 'with' power
Differentiated nature of ESDP is 
insufficiently captured by Realists  
Figure 1: Realism and the emergence of ESDP 
After having critically reviewed Realist approaches of the emergence of ESDP from both 
a theoretical and an empirical level, the conclusion to be drawn can be formulated as 
                                                 
19 See, in particular, “EU/ESDP – Barrau Report Recommends ‘Coherence Indicators’”, Agence Europe, 18 
April 2000; and, “Richard announces intensive programme for EU defence ministers during coming 
semester”, Agence Europe, 1 July 2000.  
See also the clear demands by the minister of defence, Michelle Alliot-Marie, “In Shift, France Vows To 
Modernize Military” by Keith B. Richburg, The Washington Post, 16 October 2002.  15 
 
follows:  Firstly,  Realist  theories  of  balancing  regard  structural  power  conditions  (i.e. 
unipolarity  and  a  potential  security  dilemma)  as  the  primary  determinant  of  the 
governments' alliance strategies. Secondly, it follows from this perspective that security 
cooperation  and  institution-building  is  either  directed  against  a  power  or  for  it  (i.e. 
balancing vs. bandwagoning vs. binding). Finally, the empirical record demonstrates 
that  Realist  approaches  are  not  completely  unwarranted,  but  they  do  ultimately  not 
present a comprehensive explanation in terms of their primary determinants. The shift 
of polarity corresponds to the emergence of ESDP in the end of the 1990s. While this 
does not explain the continuous nature of the French case, Realists admit that Britain 
primarily bandwagons with US power - albeit since recently on a 'strategic' basis. The 
main criticism is that Realist lenses cannot capture the differentiated nature of ESDP, 
which is characterised by both reconfirmation of NATO's primacy and the Europeans' 
desire for an autonomous force. In short, ESDP is not balancing.  
In  contrast  to  these  approaches,  the  following  chapter  largely  builds  on  the 
proposition of 'regional security needs' as the primary determinant of the emergence 
and  development  of  ESDP  (e.g.  Brooks/Wolforth  2005:  93).  The  assumption  is  that 
"institutions  are  created  by  states  because  of  their  anticipated  effects  on  patterns  of 
behaviour" (Keohane/Martin 1995: 46). Power does definitely play a role, but this does 
not indicate that only a Realist perspective is warranted. Therefore, the paper directly 
confronts Mearsheimer's famous dictum, who once argued that liberal-institutionalist 
thought was based on the assumption that "international politics can be divided into two 
realms - security and political economy - and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies 
to the latter, but not the former" (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 15-6). Although transaction costs 
reasoning  had  primarily  been  applied  to  the  latter,  it  is  shown  that  it  provides  a 
promising  heuristic  for  the  former,  too.  The  key  is  the  provision  of  information  by 
security institutions (Keohane/Martin 1995: 43-4). This is demonstrated below.  
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ESDP AND THE REDUCTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS? 
Douglass  North  once  summarised  Ronald  Coase’s  seminal  message  that  "when  it  is 
costly to transact, institutions matter" (North 1990: 12). As a point of departure, I simply 
turn this message on its head: when institutions in ESDP exist, I may find that costly 
transactions precede and determine the actors’ strategies for building these institutions 
in the first place. In security policy, too, the cooperative exchange agreements between 
states are necessarily incomplete and, thus, problems of credible commitments arise (e.g. 
Lake  1999;  Wallander  2000;  Weber  2000).  Hence  the  paper  argues  that  governments 
evaluate existing and anticipate future arrangements in terms of transaction costs and 
formulate on that basis their alliance strategies. It is shown that this theoretical lens is 
able to capture the differentiated nature of ESDP in a more comprehensive way than its 
Realist competitor.  
Theory 
The 'explanans' is based on the premise that information about other actors' behaviour in 
the European security setting is costly: transaction costs are equivalent to 'frictions in 
mechanical systems' (Williamson 1985: 1) and emerge from the cooperative exchanges of 
the main actors20 in their attempt to provide European security. The governments not 
only have to assess ex ante the valuable attributes of their exchanges, they also have to 
safeguard ex post the compliance due to the inherent incompleteness of all contracts. 
Building on Oliver Williamson, transaction costs are understood as the "comparative costs 
of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures" 
(Williamson 1985: 2). In particular, the paper focuses on one form of transaction costs.21 
‘Risks of opportunism’ bring about the problem of credible commitments and enhance 
                                                 
20 Those are, in particular, the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. 
21 In contrast to opportunism, increasingly hierarchical structures may reduce these risks, but lead inversely 
to so-called ‘governance costs’ that can be understood as the costs of making and enforcing agreements 
(Williamson 1985: 90-1). It costs money and often raises the political stakes when a government chooses to 
build a security institution instead of dealing with the problem at a unilateral level. Most prominently, states 
have to give up some autonomy that has always been a desired asset in world politics (Lake 1999: 58-9).  17 
 
the costs of cooperation.22 Governments are faced with three kinds of expected costs of 
opportunistic behaviour in security arrangements – namely abandonment, entrapment, 
and  exploitation  (Lake  1999:  52-8).  The  extent  of  all  of  these  'risks  of  opportunism' 
depends  on  two  interrelated  dimensions  of  transactions,  namely  on  uncertainty  and 
asset  specificty  (Williamson  1985:  52-60).  The  former  addresses  the  question  of  how 
other main actors will act in the near future with respect to security problems. Though to 
different degrees, it is involved in all social interactions (Williamson 1985: 57-9; Rathbun 
2007: 541-9). Asset specificity can be defined as a “specialized investment that cannot be 
redeployed  to  alternative  uses  or  by  alternative  users  except  at  a  loss  of  productive 
value” (Williamson 1996: 377; see also, Lake 1999: 8; Weber 2000: 22-5; Pierson 2004: 147-
53).  In  other  words,  it  describes  the  governments’  investments  in  political-military 
structures  that  can  or  cannot  be  redeployed  for  alternative  purposes.  Before  the 
transaction  costs  framework  is  specified,  the  'explanans'  can  be  summarised  in  the 
following way:  
• ∆  Uncertainty 
about partners
↕
• ∆  Asset 
Specificity
Transactions










• Provision of 
information to 
members of the 
institution
• Reduction of 
transaction 





• Alliance / 
institution-
building 
strategy of EU 
member states 
on the basis of 
'regional 
security needs'




Figure 2: Transaction costs and security cooperation 
                                                 
22 "Opportunism is ubiquitous in international relations. Polities do not honor commitments out of a sense of 
obligation, but press for individual advantages whenever possible. (…) Opportunism includes both blatant 
forms of self-interest seeking (…) and subtle forms of deceit" (Lake 1999: 52).  18 
 
More specifically, a state not only considers whether a certain institution should execute 
a specific function, but also whether another institution potentially performs that in a 
more desired way: “comparative institutional assessments of the adaptive attributes of 
alternative  governance  structures  must  necessarily  be  made”  (Williamson  1985:  57). 
When we apply this analytical step to the study of European security institutions, we see 
that  the  building  of  ESDP  cannot  be  adequately  explained  without  considering  the 
historically evolved default option, namely NATO. Therefore, the question of the EU's 
functional scope in security issues is inextricably linked to ex ante and - in particular - ex 
post  assessments  of  NATO  and  the  US:  a  EU  member  state  does  not  assess  the 
transaction costs of its cooperative exchanges in an absolute way, but instead compares 
it to the ability of NATO to reduce the costs of the provision of European security: “it is 
the  difference  between  rather  than  the  absolute  magnitude  of  transaction  costs  that 
matters” (Williamson 1985: 22).  
Broadly  speaking,  a  government  may  either  invest  into  a  particular  institution  or 
(threaten to) disengage from its activities. This logic is reflected by Albert Hirschman's 
typology  of  'exit'  and  'voice'  (Hirschman  1970).  The  former  refers  to  the  option  that 
“members  of  an  organisation  or  customers  can  leave  or  stop  buying  a  product.”  In 
contrast,  we  may  speak  of  voice  if  “members  of  an  organisation  or  customers  can 
express their dissatisfaction” (Hirschman 1970: 4).23 In this context, it is vital that the 
respective  costs  of  the  choice  depend  on  a  combination  of  asset  specificity  and 
uncertainty. Although the options of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ should be understood as ‘ideal-
types’, they suggest the mechanisms of both disengagement and engagement at work. 
Hence, a state may continuously participate within NATO, but consider whether some 
of its tasks may be better preformed within the EU. The ultimate decision in this respect 
is taken according to transaction costs assessments. 
In a nutshell, the transaction costs framework assumes that the governments assess 
the respective capacity of both institutions to reduce the risks of opportunism for their 
                                                 
23 “Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of 
affairs” (Hirschman 1970: 30). 19 
 
engagements in  common  security  policies. At  this stage  of  the analysis,  the  primary 
determinant  of  transaction  costs  is  uncertainty  and  thus  the  question  of  credible 
commitments.  When  the  risks  of  opportunism  increase  within  one  institutional 
arrangement to unacceptable levels, governments are assumed to seek for alternative 
ways to provide for European security. For example, they assign certain responsibilities 
to other institutions or they create new ones, which are expected to reduce the risks of 
opportunism to a sustainable extent. In Williamson's terminology, the 'completion of 
tasks under alternative governance structures' is at stake.  
Finally,  the  dimension  of  asset  specificity  is  so  critical  in  this  context  because  it 
provides a conceptual lens to understand the interface between NATO and ESDP and 
between  'exit'  and  'voice'.  Asset  specificity  refers  to  the  question  in  how  far  the 
cooperation partners' investments can be redeployed to other purposes. In particular, 
the issue at stake is in how far the military assets of ESDP can be redeployed to NATO; 
or not. General assets “are useful in a variety of transactions. They have the advantage of 
flexibility  and  potential  efficiency  across  a  broad  range  of  activities,  but  without 
specialization they are unlikely to be as effective for a particular transaction” (Wallander 
2000:  707).  In  contrast,  highly  specific  assets  promise  significant  gains  by  the 
mechanisms of economies of scale, functional differentiation and positive externalities 
(Lake  1999:  44-51).  The  EU  member  states  have  basically  two  options,  when  they 
formulate their alliance strategies under the condition of potential opportunism: either 
they  create  specific  assets  with  highly  binding  structures  to  safeguard  them  or  they 
invest into general assets with a higher degree of flexibility and accept a smaller extent 
of efficiency gains (North 1990: 34; Wallander 2000). Again, the United States play a 
major role in this context because their position has an impact on how the EU members 
assess the - ex ante - transaction costs of a possible European-only agreement:  
The  decisions  taken  in  St  Malo,  Cologne  and  Helsinki  were  all  designed  to  take  into 
account the concerns expressed by the United States and other non-EU Allies. In fact, the 
United States was the invisible guest at the table of each of these meetings (Sloan 2000: 19). 
The impact of this mechanism on the nature of ESDP is illustrated below. 20 
 
Empirical evidence 
The point of departure for the empirical analysis refers to 'historical institutionalism', 
which is capable to reconcile seemingly unbridgeable differences for the examination of 
the emergence of institutions. It is shown how  
actors select new institutions for instrumental purposes, much as rational choice analysis 
would  predict,  but  draw  them  from  a  menu  of  alternatives  that  is  made  historically 
available through the mechanisms specified by sociological institutionalism (Hall/Taylor 
1996: 957).24  
For  reasons  of  both  significance  and  comparability  with  the  Realist  approach,  the 
empirical analysis focuses on Great Britain and France and unfolds in three steps.25 First, 
the 'demand' for a European security institution is briefly examined by an analysis of 
both countries' perception of the security environment. Second, the respective - ex post - 
assessment of NATO and the EU to reduce the transaction costs for the provision of 
European security is traced back. The focus in on risks of opportunism. Finally, asset 
specificity is introduced to shed light on the utmost importance of redeployable military 
assets, which were not only the key for Great Britain to join ESDP, but determined also 
the governments' - ex ante - assessment of transaction costs. They ultimately represent a 
heuristic to understand the differentiated nature and ambivalences of the EU's political-
military project. 
Firstly, the British government perceived a general demand for a European security 
institution in the end of the 1990s that was effectively capable of crisis management (i.e. 
projection  of  force).  “The  military  challenges  we  face  are  increasingly  about  crisis 
prevention,  peacemaking  and  peacekeeping  –  about  humanitarian  operations  rather 
                                                 
24 In a sense, the focus on transaction costs corroborates primarily rational-choice institutionalism. However, 
and that is crucial, not all solutions to these collective action problems are solely functional (Pierson 2004: 
108-9). The causal path of ‘form follows function’ is an important, but not the only one available. For that 
reason, some systematic modifications are built into the framework - in particular, that several of the 
components of the envisaged costs and benefits are derived from cognitivist or interpretative concepts (e.g. 
Rathbun 2007: 541-9). The way the study is, then, conducted as well as the attention paid to path 
dependence, sunk costs etc. basically make the investigations historical-institutionalist. 
25 As indicated above, this paper is part of a larger project that systematically compared the German, British 
and French cases according to a process-tracing logic. Although the evidence presented in the subsequent 
sections may appear exemplary and biased, the main results have a much broader empirical basis (Weiss 
2008).  21 
 
than  the  collective  defense  of  territory”  (Blair  1998b).  Although  the  Conservative 
governments had also acknowledged this to a certain extent (e.g. Portillo 1997), the first 
major step was Blair's 'Strategic Defence Review' in 1998 (Government of the UK 1998):  
The strategic environment we face today is very different to that of the previous fifty 
years. The risks and challenges we face are not simply those of the Cold War minus the 
threat from the Warsaw Pact. (…) On the negative side, however, there are new risks to 
our security and our way of life. Instability inside Europe as in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, 
threatens our security. Instability elsewhere - for example in Africa - may not always 
appear to threaten us directly. But it can do indirectly, and we cannot stand aside when it 
leads to massive human suffering (Government of the UK 1998: 8-9, No. 2-9).  
To  tackle  these  increasing  risks  in  a  coordinated  way,  the  government  envisaged  a 
militarily capable security institution. The ‘organisation of choice’ was initially NATO 
(McInnes 1998: 824-7).  
The French government's perception was in some respects similar. The ‘livre blanc’ 
served  as  the  central  French  assessment  of  the  security  environment  (French 
Government 1994). Although territorial defence was not ruled out per se, its prominence 
–  similar  to  nuclear  deterrence  –  clearly  diminished  (French  Government  1994:  94). 
Instead, the French perceived an increase of security risks, such as regional instabilities, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (French Government 1994: 7-
23, 107-18). France’s experiences in the Gulf War and in the Former Yugoslavia entailed 
it  to  re-consider  some  of  its  parameters  of  military  policy.  In  particular,  the  non-
integration of French forces limited opportunities and influence in the post-Cold War 
environment and was thus subject to a dramatic transformation.26 In the beginning, the 
focus was on rapprochement with NATO (e.g. Millon 1996). After this had failed in 1997, 
the government shifted its focus on ESDP (Chirac 1999a, 1999b; Védrine 1999). We can 
adhere so far that both main actors of the European security order perceived a demand 
for a security institution to deal with increasing risks in the end of the 1990s. While 
                                                 
26 Another ‘lesson learnt’ was the abandonment of conscription. It was not only militarily, but also politically 
infeasible to send conscripts regularly into crisis management operations abroad. For instance, the French 
government had been politically unable to send conscripts into the Gulf in 1991, where numerous casualties 
were expected. Therefore, it created one light division of professionals out of fifty regiments. This had been a 
considerable, since costly, problem at the time (Heisbourg 2000: 37).  22 
 
Great Britain continuously favoured NATO, France promoted a European-only solution 
within the EU.  
Secondly,  we need  to examine  their  respective  assessments of  how  to  provide  the 
public good of European security. This cost-benefit analysis is, in turn, vitally shaped by 
NATO's and the EU's capacity to reduce  the transaction costs involved in European 
security. Since the Alliance was traditionally the default option, the question was first 
and foremost whether the United States’ commitment to all kinds of European security 
problems was still credible? Being the main architect of NATO's ‘Berlin Plus’ (1996), the 
point of departure of Britain's alliance strategy was clearly NATO with a European pillar 
of 'separable but not separate forces' (Hunter 2002: 13-28).27 By the end of the 1990s, 
however,  the  government  was  faced  with  a  lack  of  credible  information  about  the 
hegemon’s future security policies. Britain perceived an increasingly strong 'isolationist 
trend', in particular, on Capitol Hill (e.g. Blair 1998c). The awareness was strengthened 
that  the  time  might  be  gone  when  Washington  would  continuously  write  “blank 
cheques in favour of European security” (Howorth 2000: 23; see also, Posen 2004: 15).28  
While the tenet from Bosnia was for the Conservative government to concentrate its 
efforts  to  further  bind  the  Americans  into  Europe,29 the  new  Labour  Prime  Minister 
drew a distinct conclusion: “We Europeans should not expect the United States to have 
to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard.”30 Due to the fact that the risks of 
opportunism were increasing and a 'binding strategy' was regarded as futile, the British 
alliance  strategy  shifted  towards  the  EU.  This  could  not  only  provide  military 
capabilities, but, by that, increase the 'voice' opportunities in Washington: 
                                                 
27 The 'Combined Joint Task Forces' Concept of 'Berlin Plus' should not only establish a European pillar. It 
also confirmed NATO's right of first refusal in any crisis. Europe may only act alone, if NATO chooses not to 
do so (Hunter 2002).  
28 See also, “Tarnished? The Spreading War in Kosovo Reveals Europe’s Unreadiness to Act on Its Own”, by 
Peter Riddell, The Washington Post, 4 April 1999. 
29 “Major Wins Test of Policy On Europe” by Fred Barbash, The Washington Post, 2 March 1995. See also, 
“Major Warns on EU Defence Role” by Bruce Clark, Financial Times, 24 February 1996.  
30 Cited from: “Tarnished? The Spreading War in Kosovo Reveals Europe’s Unreadiness to Act on Its Own”, 
by Peter Riddell, The Washington Post, 4 April 1999.  
See also, “We thought we could deal with the Bosnian crisis alone. The guns over Sarajevo destroyed that 
illusion along with much else. Washington in the end had to get involved to provide the military muscle for 
our diplomacy” (Blair 1998c).  23 
 
I know that some feel that being close with the United States is an inhibition on closer 
European cooperation. On the contrary, I believe it is essential that the isolationist voices in 
the United States are kept at bay and we encourage our American allies to be our partners in 
issues of world peace and security (Blair 1998a, emphasis added).31 
A  viable  ‘EU-only  option’  represented  a  promising  point  of  departure  for  gradually 
providing security on behalf of Europe. At the same time, this required compatibility 
with NATO because high-intensity combat missions would not be feasible without the 
US for a considerable amount of time (e.g. Government of the UK 2003; Hoon 2005). 
Therefore, incompatibility could possibly produce new risks of opportunism.  
In  a  nutshell,  the  primary  driving  force  of  the  British  alliance  strategy  was  the 
increase of transaction costs in the course of the 1990s. It was increasingly concerned 
about US isolationism, which was particularly strong on Capitol Hill (Berger 1999; Biden 
2000). American full-scale commitment to all kinds of European security problems was 
questioned in London. This increased British risks of opportunism within NATO. More 
specifically, London feared a possible abandonment by the US in a European security 
crisis. Most-likely for domestic reasons, the US could reject to send military forces into 
the European backyard. So far, the examination traced back the motivation behind the 
British shift of 1998/9. It was primarily based on the interaction between a perceived 
demand and increased risks of opportunism within the default organisation of choice, 
that  is  NATO.  Before  we  specify  the  precise  design  of  ESDP  and  establish  a 
comprehensive account of Britain, we turn to France's comparative assessment of NATO 
and the EU.  
The  French  government  similarly  perceived  isolationist  trends  in  the  US.  It 
interpreted the Bosnian experience primarily as a manifestation of European inability 
conjoined by an American unwillingness to provide security in the European backyard 
                                                 
31 Finally, the British concerns about isolationist trends in the U.S. were further reinforced by statements of 
the new Bush administration to withdraw peacekeeping forces from Bosnia and to close military bases in 
other  European  sites:  "The  United  States’  strategic  priorities  have  also  evolved  rapidly.  A  progressive 
reduction of their commitment from parts of Europe is now under active consideration. The announcement 
of  Donald  Rumsfeld,  US  Defense  Secretary,  that  US  forces  might  withdraw  from  Bosnia  indicate  that 
European governments will need to do more to provide for their own security, especially on the borders of 
Europe where US interests are not directly engaged" (House of Lords 2002).  24 
 
(Gnesotto 1996; Gallis 2006: 14).32 After rapprochement with NATO had failed, France's 
opportunities to bind the US to European security have seriously vanished and its risks 
of  opportunism  within  a  transatlantic  context  had  further  increased.33 Abandonment 
was  not  only  a  fear,  but  was  partly  even  practised.  The  French  president  overtly 
criticised American isolationism, but could not do a lot against it: "Mr. Chirac focused 
his  anger  on  Congress,  saying  that  it  ‘all  too  often  succumbs  to  the  temptations  of 
unilateralism and isolationism’."34  
As  long  as  NATO  represented  the  only  institution  realistically  feasible  of  crisis 
management, transaction costs constantly remained at high levels for Paris. It needed 
not only to rely on a rather incredible commitments by the US, it was also faced with the 
highest costs of adjustments in actual operations. This was, in particular, emphasised by 
the French militaries, who consequently promoted a high degree of autonomy for the 
new  European  forces  (e.g.  Chirac  1999b).  If  NATO's  defence  planning  would  have 
simply been adopted, transaction costs for France would have similarly remained high: 
There  were  ‘different  sensibilities’  between  France,  whose  military  forces  are  not 
integrated  within  the  Nato  command,  and  other  allies.  ‘Some  people  want  to  do 
everything within Nato. We want to keep real autonomy for the EU’.35 
In addition, French fears of American unilateralism contributed further to its high risks 
of opportunism. That was also the fundamental building block of the  whole idea of 
                                                 
32 See also, “Des Frappes Aériennes Défensives?” by Jacques Isnard, Le Monde, 10 May 1993; and, “French 
Successfully Bluff Their Allies on Bosnia” by Alan Riding, The New York Times, 13 December 1994. 
33 "In the first place, there is no longer an automatic connection between European security and US 
intervention: during the Cold War, a crisis within Europe had consequences internationally and directly 
affected American interests. These days however, crises within Europe, such as the conflicts which shook 
the Balkans during the last decade, are part of a regional problem, and do not automatically affect the 
United States. Certainly the US did intervene, somewhat late in the day, in Bosnia, and at the beginning of 
the Kosovo crisis: realistically however, it has to be said that it is more a question of the inability of 
Europeans to deal with these situations on their own, rather than the interests of the United States, that 
prompts US intervention" (French National Assembly 2005: 13 of 60). 
34 “Chirac’s attack on Congress has a bigger target” by Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune, 9 
November 1999. 
See also, “A Big Hand in Europe”, (Edvard Mortimer and David Buchan talked to the French foreign 
minister de Charette), Financial Times, 23 January 1997; and, “Europe’s Dim View of U.S. is Evolving Into 
Frank Hostility” by Suzanne Daley, The New York Times, 9 April 2000.  
35 Cited from: “Nato deadlock over EU reaction force” by Anton LaGuardia, The Daily Telegraph, 15 
December 2000.  25 
 
‘multipolarity’  that  France  had  so  often  pushed  forward  (e.g.  Chirac  1999a;  Védrine 
1999). Both the French foreign minister and the President “called for ‘a multipolar world’ 
in which the United States would have decreasing weight internationally, starting with 
growing  US  absence  from  European  security.” 36 Despite  the  fact  that  this  rhetoric 
strongly  reminds  of  balancing  US  power,  France's  active  participation  in  NATO's 
Response Force (2002/3) entails, at least, doubts about this understanding of its alliance 
strategy (Rynning 2005). Instead, it seems more persuasive to argue in terms of 'regional 
security needs', which were responsible for the French willingness to build ESDP and to 
equip it with sufficient military capabilities. Based on this demand, a EU defence pillar 
offered the opportunity to reduce French transaction costs for the provision of European 
security to a sustainable extent.  
So far, the analysis of the risks of opportunism, which the two most powerful EU 
members were faced with before and during the initiation phase of ESDP, pointed to the 
main  determinants  of  the  establishment  of  a  EU  defence  pillar  from  a  liberal-
institutionalist perspective. In particular, the - ex post - assessment of transaction costs 
within NATO entailed the British and the French to engage within such a project. In a 
way,  the  American  impact  was  an  indirect  one  by  weakening  the  credibility  of  its 
commitment to European security. The subsequent section demonstrates that the sole 
superpower also unfolded direct influence on ESDP, namely on the precise nature of its 
military assets, which, again, can be captured by a transaction costs perspective.  
Therefore,  I  turn  to  asset  specificity  as  one  of  the  main  components  of  such  a 
framework and argue against the Realists' statements about ESDP as a form of weak or 
soft balancing. From a historical point of view, it was clear that the United States would 
address in some way or the other the European initiative in 1998/9 (e.g. Albright 1998). 
While it had already interpreted the European pillar within NATO (i.e. 'Berlin Plus') as a 
major concession to its European partners, the 'autonomy part' of ESDP did not please 
                                                 
36  “Chirac’s attack on Congress has a bigger target” by Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune, 9 
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the Clinton - and later the Bush - administrations (Sloan 2000: 20-39; Hunter 2002: 33-44, 
59-61). In other words, the political bargaining process was inaugurated.  
The American position was clear support for more military capabilities in terms of 
'burden-sharing',  while  tolerating  as  little  autonomy  as  possible.  This  referred,  in 
particular,  to  operational  planning  (i.e.  headquarters)  and  collective  defence  (Cohen 
2000a, 2000b). In contrast, the French supported as much emancipation from NATO as 
possible and a qualitative strengthening of the EU's military capabilities (Chirac 1999b; 
European Defence Meeting 2003). Last but not least, Britain wanted first and foremost 
more military capabilities for the provision of European security.37 At the same time, it 
was aware of the necessity to establish a compromise solution between the American 
and French positions (Blair 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). In short, all protagonists had a strong 
interest in more military capabilities on behalf of the Europeans, but the question was 
who  should  control  them.  How  could  an  institutional  arrangement  be  designed  that 
accommodates  between  those  extremes?  When  we  consider  these  positions  from  the 
perspective of asset specificity, we are able to understand what ESDP, in fact, represents 
in a more comprehensive way.  
The EU's defence pillar is – at the most general level – about the EU’s creation of a 
political-military  instrument  to  deal  jointly  with  emerging  security  problems.  More 
specifically, we can distinguish between two sets of assets of such an instrument.38 On 
the one hand, there was the creation of institutional structures within the Council of the 
European  Union  to  develop  a  common  political  approach  to  the  world’s  security 
problems (e.g. Political and Security Committee, European Union Military Staff, DG 9 in 
the  Council  Secretariat  etc).  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  the  military  domain  (e.g. 
European  Rapid  Reaction  Force,  battlegroups,  etc.).  Here,  the  focus  was  on  the 
establishment of military troops to conduct EU crisis management: from humanitarian 
to high intensity combat operations (i.e. Petersberg Tasks) (Weiss 2008).  
                                                 
37 This became, in particular, manifest by its permanently stronger emphasis to increase the EU's efforts in 
defence (hardware) rather than in operational planning (missions) (Weiss 2008).  
38 This distinction is closely linked to the mantra of ‘institutions, capabilities, operations’, while excluding 
the latter since the paper is on institution-building.  27 
 
From the  perspective of  the positions  of the US, France and the UK, the political 
structures of ESDP did not prompt great difficulties. They would basically not compete 
with  NATO  or  challenge  the  historically  grown  security  order  in  another  way. 
According to that, it was politically feasible to design specific - and thus, quite efficient - 
political structures of ESDP. For instance, the administrative and political instruments 
can be neither redeployed to another organisation nor to the national level. This could 
improve  coordination  in  security  issues  between  the  EU  members  by  providing 
information.  In  contrast,  the  potential  military  structures  –  or  forces  –  were  highly 
contested, but represented at the same time the desired good for all protagonists – that is 
an increase of military capabilities. This conflict was reflected by a famous statement by 
the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott:  
We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then 
grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an 
ESDI  that  initially  duplicates  NATO  but  that  could  eventually  compete  with  NATO 
(Talbott 1999: 50).39  
The  solution  was  relatively  simple,  namely  general  military  assets  for  ESDP.  The 
European  Rapid  Reaction  Force  (ERRF)  remained  organised  at  the  level  of 
“independently  deployable  brigades”  (IISS  2001:  283).  Although  some  of  the 
battlegroups  were  organised  on  a  multinational  basis,  most  of  them  remained 
nevertheless  redeployable  to  other  purposes  (Lindstrom  20007).  In  other  words,  the 
military structures were earmarked for ESDP by the national governments, but could be 
redeployed to other purposes or operate under another flag (e.g. NATO, UN).  
In contrast, the specific military asset would have been the 'European Army' - largely 
designed according to the Eurocorps Headquarters that is only deployable on the basis 
of a consensus between its members. However, such a design has never found British 
support. From the very beginning, Tony Blair defined the parameters by stating that he 
had an “open mind about what this might mean institutionally. But we are not talking 
about a European army” (Blair 1998b). The actual institutional form allowed both an 
                                                 
39 ESDI stands for ‘European Security and Defence Identity’ and refers, in fact, to NATO’s attempts to create 
a European pillar in the mid-1990s. In contrast, ESDP stands for ‘European Security and Defence Policy’, 
which was created within the EU after the Franco-British Declaration of St Malo in 1998.  28 
 
‘autonomy’  and  a  ‘burden-sharing’  interpretation  of  ESDP  and  reconciled,  thus,  the 
antagonistic principles that had dominated these debates for so long.40 More importantly, 
it debilitated the American threat of further withdrawal from European security (US 
Department  of  Defense  1995,  2003).  While  the  Europeans  provided  more  military 
capabilities, they complied to most of the 'red lines' set by Washington (e.g. no standing 
military  headquarters).  From  the  perspective  of  all  European  powers,  a  potential 
withdrawal should be avoided at any price because – compared to now – this would 
have  tremendously  increased  the  transaction  costs  for  the  provision  of  security.  The 
previous examination can be summarised as follows: 





• UK → NATO




• UK → increased risks of opportunism
↑
Weakening of American commitment 
to European security issues
↓







• Specific political assets and American 
acquiescence
• General military assets and American 
acquiescence
But: harsh opposition against specific 
military assets (e.g. headquarters)




Figure 3: Transaction costs and the emergence of ESDP 
                                                 
40 In particular, the question of standing military headquarters has illustrated this linkage because it would 
ultimately constitute a military, but specific asset of ESDP. Hence it was (and still is) one of the most 
contested issues between the US and Europe. In the meantime, there was a compromise, namely the so-
called ‘Hampton Court Formula’, which did, however, merely mitigate some of the main problems.  
This assessment is primarily based on documents that I was allowed to read, but not to quote in the German 
Ministry of Defence (Berlin: May 2007). See also, “Ein Hauptquartier, das nicht so heißen soll” by Martin 
Winter, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 May 2007. 29 
 
This section demonstrated at both a theoretical and an empirical level the value-added 
of  a  liberal-institutionalist  approach  to  the  study  of  ESDP.  After  having  proposed  a 
framework of analysis that focuses on transaction costs as the ‘explanans’, the empirical 
record  was  traced  back  in  three  steps.  It  was  shown  that  both  Britain  and  France 
perceived a demand for a security institution to deal with the growing risks. Though to 
different  degrees,  both  countries  were  increasingly  uncertain  about  the  American 
commitment to all questions of European security. This made NATO problematic in 
transaction costs terms because the risks of opportunism – in particular, vis-à-vis the 
superpower  –  had  increased.  Nevertheless,  a  full-scale  duplication  of  the  Alliance 
prompted  the  risk  of  a  potential  withdrawal,  which  was  neither  desired.  Therefore, 
ESDP was only equipped with specific – non-redeployable – assets in those areas that 
the United States was not concerned about. The key to the establishment of military 
forces was, then, the general nature of these assets. Due to the fact that most of them 
could be redeployed to national purposes or NATO facilitated an agreement between 
the antagonistic sides of ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’. In a nutshell, ESDP is about 
both  the  reduction  of  transaction  costs  for  the  provision  of  European  security  and 




This paper’s point of departure was the increasingly widespread notion of ESDP as a 
form of soft balancing US power, which was primarily promoted by American Realists. 
These scholars point out two determinants of the establishment of ESDP. First of all, 
unipolarity entailed European powers to aggregate military capabilities in a 'EU-only' 
context.  While  the  empirical  analysis  of  the  Europeans'  alliance  strategies  is  largely 
persuasive,  its  link  to  Realist  thought  is  not.  The  paper  clearly  pointed  out  that  the 
overwhelming  share  of  the  empirical  evidence  put  forward  by  Realists  is  largely 
compatible with a transaction costs framework. Here, we may speak not so much of a 
difference of principle but rather of emphasis. One major problem is that one cannot 30 
 
infer the alliance strategies from unipolarity. While Barry Posen emphasises that this 
structural condition leaves a choice, the subsequent path of his argument makes not 
clear why we need unipolarity at all. The other problem is that the only depicted shift 
refers  to  Britain's  strategic  bandwagoning  with  US  power  -  instead  of  only 
bandwagoning. It becomes not clear why this should entail the classification of ESDP as 
a (weak) balancing project. In short, Barry Posen is empirically right, but for the wrong 
theoretical reasons. 
In contrast, the second determinant - promoted by Seth Jones - refers to a potential 
security  dilemma  in  Europe.  British,  French  and  German  leaders  recognised  this 
problematique  and  were  willing  to  ameliorate  it.  The  key  was  to  bind  reunified 
Germany into a European security institution. Except some immediate responses to the 
transformations of 1989/90 - when a EU defence pillar had, in fact, failed - there is a lack 
of available evidence. The record even points into the opposite direction. Britain and 
France wanted Germany to arm - also at the national level. Although one could even 
question  the  compatibility  of  this  argument  with  Realist  thought,  41 it  is  first  and 
foremost flawed at an empirical level.  
Finally, this paper disagrees with the Realist proposition to classify ESDP as a form of 
weak  or  soft  balancing.  This  criticism  cannot  be  better  addressed  than  by  a  simple 
illustration. It is striking that Seth Jones - similar to Barry Posen - exclusively quotes one 
important part from the St Malo Declaration and the subsequent treaties on ESDP: "the 
[European Union] must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces" (e.g. cited from Jones 2007: 85, 200, 234). In contrast, Realist scholars 
deliberately omit the second principle of ESDP - which fits less into a balancing against 
or bandwagoning with power terminology:  
In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states 
subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) 
                                                 
41 There is a logical problem with subsuming the 'binding argument' under Realism. John Mearsheimer has 
vehemently argued that institutions merely serve the interests of the member states. They do not unfold 
independent influence on governments and are thus epiphenomenal (Mearsheimer 1994/95). How should 
ESDP, then, ameliorate a potential security dilemma? If it, in fact, does, Realism's hard core would severely 
come under stress. If it does not, the binding argument is dispensable.  31 
 
must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the 
European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while 
acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the 
vitality  of  a  modernised  Atlantic  Alliance  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  collective 
defence of its members.42 
This formulation directly refers to NATO's 'Berlin Plus' agreements of 1996, which had 
firmly  established  the  Alliance's  'right  of  first  refusal'  in  all  questions  of  European 
security (Hunter 2002: 17-8). The Europeans may act, if NATO chooses not to do so. In 
other  words,  the  seminal  Declaration  of  St  Malo  simultaneously  emphasises  the 
principles of an autonomous European capability and the primacy of NATO. For the very 
first  time  in  the  Union's  history,  the  EU's  Treaty  of  Nice  referred  explicitly  to  the 
Alliance. This squaring of the circle reflected the inherent tensions of ESDP from the 
very beginning and determined its nature as a political project in the subsequent years. 
"The Europeanists were not opposed to the principle of NATO involvement and the 
Atlanticists were not opposed to the principle of European autonomy" (Howorth 2000: 
69).  
In sum, this 'built-in ambiguity' does not correspond to a Realist logic. Consequently, 
the differentiated nature of ESDP remains largely invisible since it is neither directed 
against  the  sole  superpower  nor  is  it  unambiguous  support  of  it  (e.g.  Mearsheimer 
1994/5: 13; Walt 2009: 94). Hence the paper's major criticism of Realism does not refer to 
biased evidence. Instead, this instance demonstrates what the approach can grasp and 
what it cannot. In short, the complexity of ESDP - which regularly makes a difference in 
providing European security - is not adequately captured by Realist lenses.  
Therefore,  'regional  security  needs'  (e.g.  Brooks/Wolforth  2005)  served  as  an 
important  point  of  departure.  Based  on  liberal-institutionalist  thought,  the  paper 
developed a transaction costs approach to explain the emergence and development of 
ESDP.  More  specifically,  it  was  argued  that  Britain  and  France  were  increasingly 
confronted with high risks of opportunism within NATO to provide European security. 
The American commitment to all kinds of security problems had suffered credibility and, 
                                                 
42 Joint Declaration by the French and British Government, (St Malo: 3/4 December 1998), cited from: Rutten 
2001: 8-9. 32 
 
therefore, the medium powers had searched for another institutional option to perform 
this task on a long-term basis. In particular, Tony Blair argued that it was 'time to repay 
America the soldier’ (Blair 1998c). While this ex post assessment of transaction costs 
triggered the initial establishment of ESDP, ex ante transaction costs were responsible 
for  its  more  specific  design.  After  all,  the  superpower  and  most  influential  NATO 
member would not stand aside to watch the creation of a competitor to the Alliance. In 
short,  it  threatened  a  potential  withdrawal,  which  would  have  entailed  even  higher 
transaction  costs  for  the  provision  of  European  security.  Hence  ESDP  had  to  be 
compatible with NATO, which was assured by all participants and was subsequently 
incorporated into the EU's agreements. General, and thus redeployable, military assets 
represented  the  institutional  solution  to  this  alleged  dilemma.  Specific  assets  were 
merely  established  in  those  areas  that  were  less  contested  across  the  Atlantic.43 In  a 
nutshell,  Britain's  and  France's  alliance  strategies  and  the  resulting  establishment  of 
ESDP could be, therefore, inferred less from unipolarity, but rather from the classical 
advice from transaction costs economists: “Organize transactions so as to economize on 
bounded  rationality  while  simultaneously  safeguarding  them  against  the  hazards  of 
opportunism” (Williamson 1985: 32).  
Last  but  not  least,  Renate  Mayntz  once  reminded  her  audience  of  her  seminal 
discussion of ‘governance and steering’ that ‘as social scientists, concepts are our eyes’. 
From this perspective, transaction costs may, indeed, represent heuristically interesting 
‘eyes’ for the study of security cooperation and institution-building. In particular, they 
contribute to overcoming simplistic concepts that require a decision as to whether ESDP 
is ultimately a ‘balancing act against US power’ or ‘bandwagoning with the hegemon’. 
Instead, the analysis demonstrates that it was, in fact, both – and for different countries 
to different degrees. The key to a comprehensive understanding of ESDP lies in the fact 
that its institutional set-up reconciled two mutually opposing principles within a single 
political  project:  it  was  about  both  ‘European  autonomy’  and  ‘NATO’s  primacy’. 
                                                 
43 To support his book's 'soft balancing thesis', Seth Jones emphasises the EU's establishment of an 
"independent planning capability" (Jones 2007: 10). While this certainly applies to (non-contested) political 
planning, the contested issue of 'independent military planning' is, however, continuously suspended.  33 
 
Realism’s  binary  logic  at  the  conceptual  level,  however,  blinds  us  to  these  complex 
ambiguities that politics is ultimately all about.44  
In contrast, a ‘transaction costs framework’ emphasises three aspects. First of all, it 
allows  us  to  see  the  impact  of  ‘isolationist’  trends  within  the  US  that  made  its 
commitment less credible and thus increased uncertainty and transaction costs for the 
Europeans.  This  was,  however,  not  the  end  of  the  story  since  we  observed 
countervailing signals sent by Washington. The ‘threat of removal’ represented a highly 
uncertain  scenario  for  some  governments  and  thus  constrained  a  purely  functional 
formulation  of  alliance  strategies.  Instead,  compatibility  with  NATO  was  the  key  to 
reconciling the ambiguities. In short, ESDP was against and for the United States. Thus, 
the  paper's  lenses  may  allow  us  to  understand  at  a  conceptual  level  the  American  
influence on Europe that goes beyond the futile ‘balancing vs. bandwagoning’ debate. 
Furthermore,  the  concept  of  asset  specificity  turns  our  attention  to  the  crucial 
opportunities of redeployable military assets. Power projection forces were, accordingly, 
built within ESDP, but could largely be redeployed for NATO or other purposes. This 
ultimately represents the key to an understanding of the British turn at St Malo. In short, 
the  concept  of  asset  specificity  functions  as  a  kind  of  hinge  between  ‘European 
autonomy’ and ‘NATO’s primacy’. Finally, a transaction costs perspective facilitates a 
differentiated view because the paper is able to shed light on the important variances 
among  the  member  states.  France,  which  was  constantly  faced  with  high  costs  of 
adjustment in military affairs, wanted to build ESDP much earlier than, for instance, 
Britain with its special relationship as a formidable ‘fallback option’.45  
   
                                                 
44 This is primarily based on its conceptual legacy within alliance politics, which represents the primary 
prism for understanding security cooperation from a Realist point of view. 
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